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Abstract 
 I study the effect of a two-percentage point corporate tax reduction on female 
employment and wages across small and medium-sized firms in Vietnam. Using a nationally 
representative survey of Vietnamese firms, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy and find 
that firms eligible for this two-percentage point reduction do not significantly change their share 
of female workers or the total number of female workers. However, I do find that at the 
employee level, the presence of a tax reduction allows eligible firms to increase wages for the 
female workers by 69 percent relative to male workers and women at ineligible firms. Intuitively, 
this suggests that a corporate tax reduction might not increase female labor demand, but it could 
increase welfare for current female workers via higher compensation. 
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Introduction 
 Given the lowered worldwide average corporate tax rate, the economic literature has been 
overwhelmed by theoretical and empirical evidence of its expansionary effect on total economic 
output and its positive impact on firms’ various investment channels. Little attention, however, 
has been given to studying the impact of such a tax change on the labor market, and even less 
attention has been devoted to understanding its role in developing economies. To inform future 
studies and discussions, this study asks whether a corporate tax reduction for small and medium-
sized firms increases or decreases the labor demand, particularly for female workers, and wage 
rates. This population is of particular interest because of its sizable share in the Vietnamese labor 
market and its important economic implications.  The findings in this paper can provide insights 1
on future research or policy actions that can support the female Vietnamese labor force. 
To identify a causal relationship between corporate tax reduction and employment and 
wages, I rely on a unique tax reduction provided to firms meeting an eligibility requirement on 
revenue and labor size. This paper examines Vietnam’s corporate income tax (CIT) between 
2014 and 2016. The standard CIT was 22% for most firms during this period; however, a 20% 
CIT rate applied to small- and medium-sized firms with less than 200 full-time employees and 
annual revenue not exceeding VND 20 billion (or approximately US$900,000 at current 
exchange rate). This difference in tax rates could adjust the resources of a firm, which can in turn 
affect hiring practices. I exploit this difference to examine whether an effective tax reduction 
causes any variation in firms’ female labor demand. 
However, two concerns arise from using tax policies as an exogenous factor. First, there 
are many variables contributing to the variation in both tax changes and employment levels. For 
instance, a tax cut might be triggered to stimulate investment and employment. Then, low levels 
of investment are likely associated with low employment and a higher probability of reduced 
taxes, which introduced bias to the coefficient estimates. Second, causality might occur in 
reverse. Low levels of employment and output at the state-level or country-level might 
incentivize the government to adjust tax rates, which could further attenuate coefficient 
estimates. As a result, an effective model must account for issues of omitted variable bias and 
reverse causality due to the endogenous nature of tax changes. 
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I use the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises survey (Vietnam SME), which is 
available via the publicly accessible database at the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). I 
follow Pham and Ljungqvist & Smolyansky and use a difference-in-differences identification 
strategy to identify the causal effect of corporate tax reduction on female labor demand.  The 23
control group consists of firms marginally above the eligibility threshold for the unique 
reduction, and the treatment group consists of firms marginally meeting the requirement. To 
reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I include provincial fixed effect and controls at the firm-
level, which accounts for any time-invariant characteristics common among firms in a province. 
I also construct a triple-difference estimate for female workers at an eligible firm (where male 
workers at an ineligible firm are the counterfactual) to observe any effects on worker’s welfare, 
such as wage rate. 
 The channel through which corporate taxation can affect female labor demand and wages 
can be subtle and ambiguous in theory. For example, a decrease in corporate tax rate increases a 
firm’s retained earnings via higher net profits. With the additional cash flow, a firm can engage in 
a variety of expenditures or investment activities, some of which can influence its female labor 
demand. If a firm is simply interested in increasing its output level, it can do so by directly 
increasing its labor inputs; the only trade-off is that marginal output diminishes with every 
additional unit of labor. This applies an upward pressure on labor demand, and if female labor 
supply is already low, it will likely increase. If a firm decides to increase total factor productivity, 
e.g. by adopting new technology or investing in human capital, then labor inputs can respond 
directly or inversely depending on the complementarity or substitutability of labor inputs and 
technology advancement. However, a reduced corporate tax might not affect labor demand at all, 
if firms choose to spend the additional cash elsewhere, such as reducing outstanding debt.  In 45
terms of wages, increased cash flow, if allocated to additional research and development, could 
be either labor-augmenting (increase labor demand) and increase wages, or labor-saving 
(decrease labor demand) and decrease wages. In short, the relationship between corporate tax 
versus female labor demand and wages is theoretically ambiguous, and quantifying this 
relationship is an empirical question. 
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While literature specifically addressing female labor demand in developing countries in 
response to tax changes is sparse, there is literature addressing these aspects separately. In terms 
of the impacts of taxes on labor demand, empirical evidence has not found consensus regarding 
direction and magnitude. Pham studies the effect of a temporary corporate tax cut in Vietnam 
following the Great Recession and finds that for domestic firms, there are no changes in capital, 
labor and profits.  Ljungqvist and Smolyansky exploit variation in corporate tax rates between 6
counties straddling across a U.S. state border and find that a reduction in corporate tax rate does 
not boost employment and wages. However, they establish that the effect of tax changes is not 
linear throughout, since an increase in corporate taxation discourages employment and lowers 
wages.  Da Rin et al. use panel data of European firms to study how labor inputs, relatively to 7
capital inputs, increase for every unit of reduction in the effective corporate tax rate, but this 
effect is ambiguous in absolute terms.  However, when Shuai & Chmura study employment 8
growth in the U.S., rather than employment levels, they find that a corporate tax cut is 
significantly associated with faster job creation.   9
Other related literature includes Bishop & Montgomery (1993) and Faulk (2002). Both 
papers study the impact of an employment tax credit on labor demand. Bishop & Montgomery 
focus on the Targeted Job Tax Credit (TJTC) and find that the subsidy incentivizes employers to 
hire younger workers. However, most claims for the tax credits are for workers who would have 
been hired in absence of the program.  Faulk examines the Georgia’s Jobs Tax Credit program 10
and discovers that firms participating the program create 25 percent more jobs than eligible firms 
that do not participate.  11
Finally, this paper also speaks to literature studying changes in female labor supply in 
response to tax adjustments. For example, Bosch & van der Klaauw study the 2001 Dutch tax 
reform and how it lowers the fixed cost of working for married women with high-income 
partners. As a result, the reform has a positive, significant impact on female labor force 
participation.  12
My own contribution with this paper primarily comes from the combined analysis of 
three elements: corporate tax reduction and female labor demand in a developing economy. 
There are also some minor differences. For example, while my paper shares Pham’s examination 
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of Vietnamese firms, it differs in terms of methodology: I exploit a permanent change in 
corporate tax rate, rather than a temporary adjustment. This paper also differs from Bishop & 
Montgomery and Faulk in that it studies a general corporate tax reduction, instead of a specific 
type of tax credit.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
methodology, including a detailed description of the endogeneity concern and identifying 
assumptions. Section 3 discusses the main regression results and secondary findings. Section 4 
addresses some robustness checks. Section 5 concludes with some policy implications. 
Data and Methodology 
Datasets 
 This paper uses the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises surveys (Vietnam SME), 
collected biennially between June and August by the Central Institute for Economic Management 
(CIEM), the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), the Development 
Economics Research Group (DERG) at the University of Copenhagen, and the United Nations 
University (UNU-WIDER). Data are available for 2011, 2013 and 2015. The surveys report a 
representative sample of firms across 18 sectors in ten provinces of the country: Hanoi, Ha Tay, 
Hai Phong, Ho Chi Minh City, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, and 
Long An. Stratified sampling allows for a balanced sample of firms in each province of different 
ownership forms. 
 For each year’s survey, there are three modules: enterprise, economic, and employee. The 
enterprise module reports on firm’s performance, history, employment, business environment, 
and demographic information about the owner. The employee module collects information on 
educational background, work experiences, union membership, and household characteristics of 
a representative sample of employees. Finally, the economic module lists revenues, expenses, 
asset, liability, and capital accounts of firms. 
Control and Treatment Groups 
 Based on Decree No. 32/2013/QH13, the unique CIT rate of 20% only applies to firms 
whose total number of full-time employees is below 200 and annual revenue not exceeding VND 
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20 billion. Then, the treatment group consists of firms whose labor size and nominal revenue are 
below the mentioned threshold. Firms not meeting either requirements make up the control 
group. 
 Without any restriction, the control and treatment groups are extremely unbalanced. 
Particularly, only 9 percent of the observations in 2013 and 2015 belongs to the control group, 
and 91 percent belongs to the treatment group. To re-balance the samples, I restrict the sample to 
only firms with at least 50 employees and at most 500 employees. This returns a sample of 346 
observations for years 2013 and 2015, with 60 percent of the sample are control firms and 40 
percent are treatment firms.   13
Identification Strategy for Enterprise Regression 
 I pursue a difference-in-differences identification strategy. The first difference compares 
firms that were not eligible for a differential tax treatment (control group) and firms eligible for 
the differential tax treatment (treatment group). The second difference compares firms before and 
after the tax change; the timing of the Vietnam SME surveys allows me to use 2013 as pre-
treatment and 2015 as post-treatment. The difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of a CIT 
reduction (! ) is estimated by the following regression: 
!  
where !  is the outcome variable of interest, corresponding to a firm !  in district !  in province ! ; 
!  is an indicator for being in 2015; !  is an indicator for being in the treatment 
group (i.e. eligible for the differential tax treatment); !  is a set of controls for firm’s 
characteristics; !  is a fixed-effect at the provincial level, to account for any time-invariant 
differences common among firms in each of the ten provinces. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the district-level. 
 By estimating any causal relationship at the enterprise-level, my main assumption 
requires that policymakers make decisions independently of a single firm’s female employment 
levels. If the difference-in-differences regression is estimated at any level greater than the firm-
level, such as district-level or province-level, then it might run the risk of reverse causality. For 
example, if two largest provinces of the country like Hanoi and HCMC have low level of female 
β1
(1)  yidc = β0 + β1Postidc × Treatidc +  β2Postidc + β3Treatidc + β4Xidc + δc + εidc
yidc i d c
Postidc Treatidc
Xidc
δc
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employment, then policymakers might be encouraged to adjust current laws to boost 
employment. This would bias our coefficient estimate downward. 
The use of fixed effect at the provincial level and other controls at the firm-level 
minimizes omitted variable bias. Suppose a firm in Hanoi is more likely to hire female workers 
than a firm in Ha Tay because of some inherent differences between the two provinces, e.g. 
urban versus rural. If urban firms are also more affected by tax changes than rural firms, then the 
coefficient estimate is biased upward. The inclusion of province fixed-effect corrects for this 
bias. Suppose certain characteristics at the firm-level are also correlated with female employment 
and tax changes, then the inclusion of firm-level controls corrects for this bias as well. 
Table 1–Descriptive Statistics, Enterprise-level Data: 2011 and 2013 
Control Firms Treatment Firms
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Share of Female Workers 87 0.437 0.216 75 0.515 0.255
Total Female Workers 87 53.10 45.63 75 46.87 37.23
Panel B: Explanatory Variables
Total Labor Force 87 117.0 69.41 75 86.95 39.47
Share of Union Workers 68 0.782 0.226 46 0.802 0.230
Firm Investment (million VND) 87 6,713 11,543 75 2,104 3,588
Access to Road 87 0.943 0.234 75 0.947 0.226
Net Profit per Worker +1 (log) 75 3.384 1.301 68 1.913 1.074
Asset per Worker + 1 (log) 87 5.241 0.970 75 4.349 1.119
Debt per Worker + 1 (log) 68 3.425 1.512 51 2.432 1.364
Tax Payment per Worker + 1 (log) 87 1.897 1.115 75 1.469 0.997
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Notes: Data have been restricted to include only observations closely positioned around the threshold of 200. The 
remaining observations included firms whose sizes range from 50 employees to 500 employees; the choice of 
bounds was arbitrary and only reflected a more balanced sample for control and treatment firms. 
 To better understand the characteristics of the control and treatment firms before the 
policy, I provide summary statistics of control and treatment firms in Table 1. The outcome 
variables of interest in this regression are share of female workers and total female workers. 
Control firms appear to have a lower share of female workers, but higher total number of female 
workers than treatment firms. However, these differences are not statistically significant. With 
my definition of treatment group, the control firms clearly have a large labor size on average. As 
a result, the output potential for control firms is larger, as seen in their higher investment, net 
profit, asset, debt, and tax payment. 
Figure 1. Parallel Trends, Average Share of Female Labor 
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Figure 2. Parallel Trends, Average Female Workers 
!  
I test for the parallel trends between control firms and treatment firms’ share of female 
labor and total female workers prior to the CIT change. Figure 1 visualizes the parallel trend for 
average share of female labor between the control and treatment firms, and fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a parallel trend. Figure 2 visualizes the parallel trends for average female 
workers, and rejects the null hypothesis. The lack of parallel trend in growth of total female 
workers between the control and treatment firms violates the assumption of the difference-in-
differences identification, and the coefficient estimates should only be taken as suggestive. 
Identification Strategy for Employee Regression 
 To estimate the effect the tax change at the employee-level, I construct a triple difference 
estimate, similar to what Muralidharan & Prakash use to estimate the effect of the Cycle program 
on girl’s average schooling.  The first difference is between eligible and ineligible firms; the 14
second difference compares outcomes before and after implementation of the tax change. The 
third difference compares female and male workers. Then, the triple difference estimate (! ) of  
the effects of a CIT change is as follows: 
Av
er
ag
e 
Fe
m
al
e 
W
or
ke
rs
35.0
43.8
52.5
61.3
70.0
Year
2011 2013 2015
Control Firms Treatment Firms
β1
!  of !11 27
CIT Change 
2014
11
Duong: Fiscal Incentives for Hiring Female Workers? Evidence from Vietna
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
where !  is the outcome variable for a worker !  at firm !  in district !  and province ! ; !  is 
an indicator for being in 2015; !  is an indicator for being in the treatment group; 
!  is an indicator taking a value of 1 if the worker is female, and 0 if the worker is 
male. !  is a fixed-effect at the firm-level, which accounts for common time-invariant 
characteristics among workers in a firm. !  is a set of controls for job characteristics, and !  
is a set of controls for worker demographics; the inclusion of these terms minimizes the risk of 
omitted variable bias and prevents intensifying the coefficient estimate. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Table 2–Descriptive Statistics, Employee-level Data: 2011 and 2013 
yijdc i j d c Postijdc
Treatijdc
Femaleijdc
ωj
Cijdc Dijdc
Male Female
VARIABLES N Mean SD N Mean SD
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Monthly Wage in 1000 VND 213 7,327 49,65
5
233 3,683 1,626
Derived monthly wage (log) 213 8.222 0.516 233 8.131 0.394
Panel B: Explanatory Variables
Age 214 34.18 8.253 233 32.01 8.035
Employee has formal labor contract 214 0.930 0.256 233 0.936 0.246
Number of years working at current firm 214 6.439 4.504 233 6.004 5.481
Employee lives and works in same province 214 0.771 0.421 233 0.815 0.389
Employee receives on-the-job training 214 0.477 0.501 233 0.343 0.476
Employee is a union member 126 0.825 0.381 159 0.893 0.310
Employee owns a house 214 0.710 0.455 233 0.742 0.438
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Notes: Data have been restricted to include only employees working at firms whose total labor size is close to 200. 
The remaining observations included employees in firms whose sizes range from 50 employees to 500 employees; 
the choice of bounds was arbitrary and only reflected a more balanced sample for control and treatment firms. 
I provide summary statistics for male and female workers in 2011 and 2013 in Table 2, to 
observe any differences between the two groups prior to the tax change. I observe that prior to 
the  tax  change,  female  workers  earn  4  million  VND  less  than  male  workers  every  month  
(approximately $175 at the current exchange rate). However, other attributes such as average 
age, years working at current firm, union membership, and homeownership are very similar 
between the two groups. For the triple-difference regression, the main outcome variable of 
interest is the log of monthly wage rate, derived by scaling hourly, daily, and weekly wages to a 
monthly basis.  The log-transformation is used since the distribution of wages is highly right-15
skewed. 
Table 3–Testing Parallel Trends Assumption, Triple Difference Estimate 
(1)
VARIABLES Derived Monthly Wage (log)
Post x Treated x Female -0.256
(0.158)
Post x Female 0.119
(0.101)
Treated x Female -0.0684
(0.105)
Post x Treated 0.219
(0.161)
Post 0.207*
(0.110)
Treated 0.232*
(0.138)
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Regression includes firm fixed-effect and controls for job characteristics and worker demographics. These 
include job junctions, whether the worker has a formal contract, number of years working in current firm, whether 
the worker's residence is in the same province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-job training, and the 
sector of the worker's previous job, as well as relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in 
a union, house ownership status, and type of housing. Standard errors are robust. 
I test for parallel trends between female workers in eligible firms and male workers in 
ineligible firms by derived wage rate for the years prior to the CIT change. Since a triple 
difference estimate can be difficult to visualize, result for the test of parallel trends is 
summarized in Table 3. I find that the coefficient for the triple interaction term is not 
significantly different from zero, and do not reject the null hypothesis that there is a parallel trend 
in wages between female workers in eligible firms and male workers in ineligible firms. 
Results 
Impact on Female Labor Demand 
 The difference-in-differences estimates for the impact of the CIT reduction based on 
equation (1) are presented in Table 4. Column 1 and 2 present the effect of a two-percentage 
points reduction in CIT on share of female labor. Column 3 and 4 present the effect of the CIT 
reduction on total female workers. The estimates with only province fixed-effect are presented in 
column 1 and 3. The estimates with province fixed-effect and controls for firm’s characteristics 
are presented in column 2 and 4. My preferred method will be the difference-in-differences 
regression with both province fixed-effect and firm-level controls.  
Female -0.127*
(0.0703)
Constant 8.032***
(0.464)
Observations 210
R-squared 0.766
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Table 4–Diff-in-diff Regression for Share of Female Labor and Total Female Workers 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All regressions include province fixed-effect; other controls for firm's characteristics include total labor size, 
firm's investment (in million VND), log of last year's debt (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's 
asset (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's net profit (in million VND) per worker (plus one), 
log of last year's tax payment (in million VND) per worker (plus one), share of union workers and whether firms 
have road access. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
 
 Table 4 shows that the additional two-percentage points reduction in CIT reduces the 
share of a firm’s female labor by 1 percentage point and the total number of female workers by 6 
workers. However, the estimates of !  do not significantly differ from zero, which suggests that 
eligibility for the differential CIT rate does not affect firms’ female labor size. A few points are 
worth noting: 
Share of Female Labor Total Female Workers
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Treated 0.0169 -0.0137 -7.110 -6.185
(0.0476) (0.0657) (7.704) (8.477)
Post 0.000659 0.0584 5.086 11.23**
(0.0233) (0.0379) (6.060) (4.803)
Treated 0.0703** 0.0778 -6.785 8.952
(0.0340) (0.0580) (6.049) (6.513)
Constant 0.399*** 0.764*** 46.56*** 11.94
(0.0247) (0.162) (6.367) (29.32)
Observations 346 170 346 170
R-squared 0.079 0.231 0.065 0.608
Controls for Firms' Characteristics No Yes No Yes
β1
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 When estimating for share of female labor, the !  estimate falls by 0.02 when including 
controls for firm’s characteristics, from 0.017 to -0.014, which raises concerns over omitted 
variables even though the parallel trends assumption is met. In addition, the sign of !  changes 
from positive to negative, but since its magnitude remains relatively close to zero, I conclude that 
the effect of the CIT reduction is ambiguous or absent.  
When estimating for total number of female workers, the !  estimate falls from -7.11 to 
-6.19. However, both coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant, and since the parallel 
trends assumption does not hold, the result should only be suggestive. 
Impact on Female Workers’ Wages 
 To study the effect of the CIT reduction on employees, I use equation (2) to estimate the 
impact of a firm being eligible on its worker’s derived monthly wage. Table 5 presents the triple 
difference coefficient estimates without any controls (column 1), with controls for job 
characteristics (column 2), with controls for worker demographics (column 3), and with both 
types of control (column 4). All four regressions include a firm fixed-effect to account for any 
common time-invariant attributes of workers in a single firm.  
 The inclusion of controls for job characteristics raises the !  estimate from 0.236 to 0.386 
(column 1 to column 2). This might suggest that job characteristics are correlated with being a 
female worker in an eligible firm and with a worker’s wage rate, but in different direction. For 
example, female workers at an eligible firm might be more likely to live and work in the same 
province, but workers who live in the same province generally receive lower wages, since 
employers do not need to compensate for traveling expenses.  
The inclusion of worker demographics also increases the estimated !  coefficient from 
0.236 to 0.439 (column 1 to column 3). Then, worker demographics are also correlated with 
worker’s gender in an eligible firm and with wage rate, and in opposite direction. For instance, 
having a better education will likely raise wage rate, but male workers on average might have 
higher educational attainment than female in Vietnam. 
When including both types of controls, the estimated coefficient !  increases from 0.236 
to 0.688 (column 1 to column 4), and becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. Then, 
β1
β1
β1
β1
β1
β1
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including both controls in the model must further explain the remaining variation in wage rates, 
and it is ideal to include them in later regressions. In the context of the paper, when considering 
common time-invariant attributes of workers in a single firm and other characteristics of the 
workers’ job and demographic, an additional two-percentage points reduction in CIT rate leads to 
an increase of 69% in monthly wage rate for female workers (relative to male workers at an 
ineligible firm). 
Robustness Checks 
Selection Bias 
 It is possible that firms can adjust their hiring decision prior to the implementation of the 
CIT change. This would lead to a selection bias, where firms whose labor size and annual 
revenue are near the threshold might contract their output and employment to receive the 
additional tax benefits. One solution is to identify eligibility of a firm prior to the announcement 
of the tax change, assuming the eligibility status of firms remains constant prior to and after the 
announcement of the pending tax change. 
Table 5–Triple Difference Regression for Derived Monthly Wage (log) 
Derived Monthly Wage (log)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Treated x Female 0.236 0.386** 0.439** 0.688***
(0.144) (0.159) (0.208) (0.226)
Post x Female -0.219** -0.226** -0.177 -0.188
(0.0960) (0.111) (0.126) (0.141)
Treated x Female -0.0689 -0.215* -0.382** -0.476***
(0.100) (0.121) (0.189) (0.167)
Post x Treated -0.215 -0.174 -0.374 -0.476
(0.160) (0.151) (0.245) (0.404)
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All regressions include firm fixed-effect; controls for job characteristics include job functions, whether the 
worker has a formal contract, number of years working in current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the same 
province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-job training, and the sector of the worker's previous job; 
controls for worker demographics include relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in a 
union, house ownership status, and type of housing.  
First, I set up a panel data of firms with data in both 2013 and 2015. I then determined a 
firm to be “eligible” if their labor size in 2013 is less than 200 employees and their annual 
revenue in 2013 is less than 20 billion VND. Eligibility status for a firm will be carried over to 
that same firm in year 2015. Then, equation (1) and (2) will be used to estimate the regressions 
on share of female labor and log of derived monthly wage. Table 6 and Table 7 present the 
regression results. 
Post 0.354*** 0.375*** 0.414*** 0.422***
(0.124) (0.143) (0.151) (0.131)
Treated -0.161 0.0390 -0.256 -0.153
(0.164) (0.256) (0.310) (0.305)
Female 0.0211 0.0711 0.0383 0.0564
(0.0605) (0.0817) (0.0955) (0.0995)
Constant 8.876*** 8.851*** 7.440*** 8.239***
(0.180) (0.389) (0.652) (0.688)
Observations 442 313 283 205
R-squared 0.597 0.676 0.641 0.751
Controls for Job Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Controls for Worker Demographics No No Yes Yes
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Table 6–Testing for Selection Bias, Enterprise-level 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Regression includes province fixed-effect and other controls for firm's characteristics: total labor size, firm's 
investment (in million VND), log of last year's debt (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's asset 
(in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of last year's net profit (in million VND) per worker (plus one), log of 
last year's tax payment (in million VND) per worker (plus one), share of union workers and whether firms have road 
access. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
Table 7–Testing for Selection Bias, Employee-level 
(1)
VARIABLES Share of Female Labor
Post x Treated -0.0276
(0.0733)
Post 0.0440
(0.0400)
Treated 0.0340
(0.0775)
Constant 0.957***
(0.257)
Observations 116
R-squared 0.226
(1)
VARIABLES Derived Monthly Wage (log)
Post x Treated x Female 0.601*
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Regression includes firm fixed-effect, controls for job characteristics and worker demographics. Controls for 
job characteristics include job junctions, whether the worker has a formal contract, number of years working in 
current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the same province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-
job training, and the sector of the worker's previous job. Controls for worker demographics include relationship with 
owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in a union, house ownership status, and type of housing.  
If there is selection bias, then we might expect the coefficient estimate in Table 4 column 
2 to be more negative if firms intentionally fire workers to reduce labor size. However, the new 
estimation of !  in Table 6 is -0.0276, which is very similar to, if not smaller than the !  
estimation of -0.0137 in Table 4. This suggests that firms might not intentionally contract their 
(0.338)
Post x Female -0.158
(0.161)
Treated x Female -0.220
(0.191)
Post x Treated -0.105
(0.355)
Post 0.449***
(0.143)
Treated 0.168
(0.265)
Female 0.0992
(0.110)
Constant 8.302***
(0.930)
Observations 153
R-squared 0.798
β1 β1
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output and employment to receive differential tax treatment. In addition, since both estimations 
are statistically insignificant, I conclude that selection bias does not significantly influence the 
regression results. 
 Similarly, if selection bias significantly influences female worker’s wages, then we would 
observe a drastic change in the coefficient estimate !  in equation (2) from Table 5 to Table 7. 
However, an estimate of 0.601 is hardly different from 0.688 (in Table 5 column 4), even though 
this estimate is only significant at the 10% level. The loss of significance likely suggests that the 
new definition of eligibility may not have the most predictive power. In short, selection bias does 
not significantly affect wage rates of female workers in eligible firms relative to male workers in 
ineligible firms. 
Heterogeneity in Wage Rates by Pay Period 
 Another limitation of this paper stems from the calculation of monthly wage rate. And 
while this calculation might be prone to measurement errors, it is at greater risks of violating 
another crucial assumption: that workers paid on an hourly, daily, and monthly basis are similar. 
If this assumption is violated, the estimated coefficient might be overestimated. 
 To test for any heterogeneity among workers by their pay period, I re-run the regression 
using equation (2), with the inclusion of a fixed-effect for pay period (hourly, daily, monthly). 
Table 8 presents the regression result; I find that there is a decline in the coefficient estimate ! , 
from 0.688 to 0.577, when difference in pay period is considered. I observe that workers paid on 
an hourly basis receive a derived monthly wage rate six times greater than workers paid daily. 
Then, the calculation of monthly wage for workers paid hourly is inflated, which biases the 
coefficient estimate of the triple-difference upward. However, the direction of the triple-
difference coefficient is still positive, and its magnitude still large. When controlled for 
heterogeneity by pay period, female workers in an eligible firm receive a monthly wage 58% 
greater than male workers in an ineligible firm. In other words, differences among workers by 
pay period do not significantly change our conclusion on the wage increase for female workers 
in eligible firms. 
β1
β1
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Heterogeneity from Other Policies 
 A threat to the internal validity of this paper is the presence of other policies between 
2013 and 2015 that could confound the effect of the CIT change on female labor and female 
wages. Two examples of such policies are Decree 05/2015/ND-CP and Decree 85/2015/ND-CP. 
The first decree, implemented in March 2015, details rules regarding contract negotiations, such 
as wage equality, overtime compensation, and other non-wage benefits.  The second decree, 16
implemented in November 2015, details several articles of the Labor Code regarding company 
policies toward female workers.  The timing of these policies might confound the impact of the 17
CIT reduction, since firms could adjust their wage negotiations process with female workers; the 
coefficient estimate might be biased upward. 
 As an attempt to correct for these confounding policy implementations, I proxy the 
impact of these policies using a firm owner’s self-reported knowledge about gender equality 
laws. The assumption behind this proxy is that in firms that are more affected by gender equality 
laws, their owners will have a better understanding of these laws. Table 9 summarizes the 
owners’ self-reported knowledge of these laws. 
Table 8–Testing for Heterogeneity in Pay Period 
(1)
VARIABLES Derived Monthly Wage (log)
Post x Treated x Female 0.577***
(0.188)
Pay Period FE (Base Case = Daily)
Pay Period = Hourly 6.021***
(0.301)
Pay Period = Monthly 1.360***
(0.0633)
Constant 7.666***
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Regression includes firm and pay period fixed-effects, and controls for job characteristics and worker 
demographics. Controls for job characteristics include job junctions, whether the worker has a formal contract, 
number of years working in current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the same province as the firm, whether 
the worker receives on-the-job training, and the sector of the worker's previous job; controls for worker 
demographics include relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is in a union, house 
ownership status, and type of housing. Standard errors are robust. 
 Using the values from Table 9, I create a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the owner 
has average or good knowledge about gender equality laws, and 0 if the owner has poor or no 
knowledge about these laws. I then construct a quadruple-difference regression similar to 
Muralidharan & Prakash as follows: 
where !  is the dummy variable created above; other terms in the model are as 
described in equation (2).  Table 10 presents the triple-difference estimate for Post x Treated x 18
Female, and the quadruple-difference coefficient estimate. The coefficient estimate for the 
quadruple-interaction is negative but not significantly different from zero. Then, for firms whose 
owners have at least average knowledge of gender equality laws, being a female and working in 
a firm eligible for the additional CIT reduction does not lead to any changes in wages. However, 
the triple-difference estimate for Post x Treated x Female remains highly positive and significant 
(0.405)
Observations 205
R-squared 0.905
AboveAverageijdc
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at the 1% level. The magnitude of this estimate suggests that for all eligible firms regardless of 
owners’ knowledge about gender equality laws, the presence of the CIT reduction raises wages 
for female workers by 72%.  
Table 9–Descriptive Statistics, Self-reported Knowledge of Gender Equality Laws 
Notes: Data have been restricted to include only observations closely positioned around the threshold of 200. The 
remaining observations included firms whose sizes range from 50 employees to 500 employees; the choice of 
bounds was arbitrary and only reflected a more balanced sample for control and treatment firms. 
 These results could hint at a lack of heterogeneity caused by these confounding policies, 
but more likely they suggest that owner’s knowledge of these policies is not an accurate proxy of 
these policies’ actual effect. Further research, and perhaps a more comprehensive data source, is 
needed to account for confounding policy effects. 
Table 10–Heterogeneity from Other Policies 
(1)
VALUES Frequency
Good 27
Average 121
Poor 143
No Knowledge 229
Total 520
(1)
VARIABLES Derived Monthly Wage 
(log)
Post x Treated x Female x Above Average -0.322
(0.446)
Post x Treated x Female 0.723***
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Regression includes firm fixed-effect, controls for job characteristics, worker demographics and fixed-effect 
for owner's knowledge about gender equality laws. Controls for job characteristics include job junctions, whether 
the worker has a formal contract, number of years working in current firm, whether the worker's residence is in the 
same province as the firm, whether the worker receives on-the-job training, and the sector of the worker's previous 
job; controls for worker demographics include relationship with owner, age, education level, whether the worker is 
in a union, house ownership status, and type of housing 
Conclusion 
 This paper studies the impact of a two-percentage points CIT reduction on female labor 
demand and female wages in small- and medium-sized firms. The difference-in-differences 
estimate suggests an insignificant change in female labor size. On the other hand, the triple-
difference estimate confirms an increase by 69% in female wages in eligible firms relative to 
male wages in ineligible firms. One possible explanation is that when firms received two 
additional percentage points reduction in CIT, they did not adjust their employment levels, and 
the extra cash flow either allowed them to better compensate female workers, or allowed them to 
replace previous unskilled female workers with new skilled female workers, whose wage 
demand were higher. 
 This paper might support future corporate tax cuts in developing countries like Vietnam. 
However, certain precautions must be taken in terms of econometrics and policy analysis. First, 
there remains concerns about heterogeneity from confounding policies. There are most likely 
unobservable effects from policy implementations or social movements in Vietnam that could 
significantly drive the results. Without finding an accurate proxy or measurement of other 
effects, no definite conclusions can be drawn about the true causal effect of a tax reduction. 
Second, from a policy analysis perspective, the benefit of a corporate tax reduction could be 
(0.246)
Constant 8.528***
(0.871)
Observations 205
R-squared 0.768
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outweighed by its cost in the government budget. Usually, a current tax cut would be followed by 
a future tax hike, so that governments could reduce its budget deficit. At the same time, lower tax 
revenue might also imply reduced provision of necessary public services, which might have 
long-term consequences for traditionally disadvantaged groups like female workers. This 
intersection between econometric analysis and cost-benefit policy analysis would make an 
excellent addition to any strands of literature studying the impact of taxes or the female labor 
market.  
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